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A COMPARATIVE CASE STUDY OF SELECTED 
PHASES OF LAW  FOR THE DENTIST*
By J a ck so n  L. D avis , A.B., L .L .B ., D .D .S.
Instructor in Dentistry, Howard University
T N  the preface to his work entitled “ Dental Jurisprudence,”  published 
in 1892, Dr. W m . F. Rehfuss makes the following; observation: 
“ Owing to the wonderful advancement within late years of the dental 
sciences, embracing the discovery of many new operations and methods 
of treatment, increased responsibilities are accredited to the dental 
surgeon, the neglect of which might involve him in litigation, and 
the knowledge thereof may at some period in his professional career 
avoid a calamity of a serious nature. For this reason, a knowledge 
of dental jurisprudence would be of infinite value to the young graduate 
(and may we add, to the old and seasoned practitioner as w ell) who 
too frequently enters upon his professional duties utterly ignorant and 
oblivious of the legal responsibilities incident to the practice of his 
profession. An error of judgment, recklessness, a careless mistake, or 
unprofessional conduct may involve him in unwonted trouble that 
might ruin his whole professional career.”
Thirty-five years later, Elmer D. Brothers in the introduction to his 
second edition of the same subject says in substance as follows:
“ Every man should be broader than his calling. The time has passed 
when the practitioner in any profession may rest content with a 
knowledge of those things which pertain only to his profession. This 
proposition applies with special emphasis when the law, to which as 
a practitioner, he is ever amenable, is the subject involved. In fact such 
law is an essential and inherent element of his profession, because with 
such knowledge he is better able to discharge the legal duties and 
responsibilities inseparable from his activities.”
W e are in absolute accord with the views herewith set forth, and 
on this occasion shall endeavor to present for consideration and enlighten­
ment, as our subject indicates, a study of a few adjudicated cases illus­
trative of a few chosen phases of law for the dentist. The discussion 
is not designed to prepare any one of us for the practice of law, but 
by spending a little while from time to time in such studies as this, 
we may become better dentists and citizens by being enabled to dis­
charge our special duties with intelligent foresight and to measure our 
rights by the accumulated experience of the ages. Instead of attempting
* Presented as a Faculty Seminar, March 30, 1936.
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to cover in harem-scarem fashion the whole broad field of Dental 
Jurisprudence, we are submitting, we hope, a fairly exhaustive con­
sideration of chosen subdivisions of the subject; and instead of a long 
drawn cut recitation of abstract principles of law we have chosen to 
bring to your consideration some well settled concrete cases illustrating 
the application of abstract principles of law.
The subdivisions which we have chosen are as follow s:
The over-lapping of medical and dental practice; the value of oral 
peculiarities and dental records in the identification of persons before 
and after death ; the ever present elements of skill, care and judgm ent; 
malpractice and its various variations; and some selected miscellaneous 
considerations.
W hile some of the citations and references are to cases involving 
the practice of the physician and surgeon they will be found to apply 
by analogy to dental practice; and may we explain that the great 
majority of these cited cases have gone upon appeal to courts of 
superior jurisdiction, so that the decisions quoted represent established 
precedents in the respective cases.
N ow  our first consideration will be the legal limitations on dental 
practice or the over-lapping of dental practice into the practice of 
medicine. Very often the question may arise as to how far the dentist 
may go in his practice without being chargeable with practicing medicine 
without a license. This is particularly true where a dentist is specializ­
ing in oral surgery. On this particular point, there seems to be little 
authority or opinion. So far I have found only one case in point. It 
was cited by Childs in the October Cosmos 1922, and is entitled “ In 
Re Carpenter, 196 M ich. 561. The case was an incurable cancer of 
the mouth which was treated by the dentist in consultation with, and 
under the direction of the attending physician. The service by the 
dentist involved treating and cleansing the cancer daily for several 
months and the use of cocain and various antiseptics. The fee amounted 
to $358.00, a part of which had been paid and upon death of the 
patient, the dentist sued the estate for the unpaid balance of $138.00. 
The estate refused payment on the grounds that the dentist was prac­
ticing medicine without a license. The lower court allowed the claim 
and the higher court in affirming the award said in substance as follows: 
“ W e  are of the opinion that claimant is entitled to recover upon either 
of two theories: First, that the services were those of a nurse under 
the direction of a surgeon; and, second, that the treatments given by 
the dentist were clearly such as he was authorized to give as a duly 
licensed and qualified dentist. N ow  while this case was decided in 
the light of the Michigan State Statute, its holding should be of general
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interest to the dental profession as tending to establish a precedent for 
future guidance.
N ow  in this same connection it may be said that some dentists still 
doubt their legal right to treat cases by internal medication. This 
belief should be corrected as it depends largely on their ability. In 
treating highly nervous patients a sedative may be necessary and there 
are many cases requiring nerve stimulation. Painful conditions often 
require internal medication even to the point of prescribing narcotics. 
A  dentist certainly might be held responsible for neglect in failing to 
use internal treatment where required. O f course, he is not expected 
to prescribe remedies unless he is thoroughly conversant with their 
effects and their proper mode of administration.
And now, we come to the other side of the question, the right of 
the physician and surgeon to practice dentistry by virtue of his license 
as a general practitioner. This is a question of interest to both pro­
fessions. And in this connection it may be broadly stated that in the 
absence of a statute to the contrary, the general medical practitioner 
has a legal right to practice dentistry. This on the ground that dentistry 
is a branch of medicine, and a license to practice the latter includes 
the former. There is a growing tendency, however, towards a change 
by legislative enactments making dentistry a separate calling. In most 
states we have separate statutes, one regulating the practice of medicine 
and the other regulating the practice of dentistry. W here such dental 
acts do not expressly except physicians from their operation (which they 
do however in many states) some difficulty often arises in determining 
the right of the physician to practice dentistry by virtue of his license 
as a general practitioner.
The question has been passed upon in a number of cases and the 
decisions are not in accord. Some have held one way and some the 
other, and the reasoning of the courts may be perhaps best illustrated 
by a review of a case from each class. As an example of a holding 
that a general license to practice medicine also covers the practice of 
dentistry, a Rhode Island case adjudicated in 1899 will serve. The 
title to this case is State v. Beck, 21 R .I. 288; or 43 Atl. 366. In this 
case the dental act of Rhode Island enacted in 1888 antedated the medic­
inal act by seven years, and the dental act did not exclude physicians 
from its provision, nor exempt them from its restriction.
Indictment was brought in 1899 against one Horace P. Reck, a 
physician, charging him with practicing dentistry without a license. 
PI is plea was, of course, that by virtue of his qualification to practice 
medicine he was qualified to practice it in all its branches upon all 
parts of the human body, including the teeth. After much profound
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discussion, the plea was sustained. A  great many state dental statutes 
were referred to which excepted physicians and surgeons and in view 
of all precedents considered, it was held that this special dental act 
could not be interpreted to apply to licensed medical practitioners.
This brings us to the consideration of that class of cases in which 
it was held that license to practice medicine and surgery did not confer 
the right to practice dentistry. The case of State v. Taylor, 106 Minn. 
218; (118 N .W . 1012), will be considered. This case came to trial 
in 1908 and the facts involved are substantially as follow s: Dr. Taylor, 
a physician was convicted of practicing dentistry without a license, in 
violation of the 1907 State Dental Act and he appealed his case. He 
was a licensed physician and claimed that such license entitled him 
to practice dentistry on his own patients. He extracted two teeth and 
took impressions and had dentures constructed and delivered them 
and collected a fee. It was conceded that he did not have a certificate 
from the State Board of Dental Examiners. The court of appeals 
affirmed the conviction of the lower court and in its reasoning among 
many other things said: “ It is true as defendant contends that the 
practice of medicine and surgery in a broad and comprehensive sense 
includes the practice of dentistry which is medical, surgical, or prosthetic. 
In so far as it is a direction of medical science to the prevention, modi­
fication, or removal by medical, and hygienic remedies of the causes and 
effects of disease in the dental organs, it forms a part of the physician’s 
practice, just as does the treatment of cerebral, cardiac, or pulmonary 
diseases. In so far as it is an application of surgical skill to the 
fractures or to staphvloraphv, it is simply oral surgery, involving only 
such knowledge and skill in the use of instruments as every surgeon 
must possess. In the absence of legislation a certificate authorizing one 
to practice medicine and surgery would therefore entitle him to practice 
dentistry.
For reasons of public policy, however, this legislature has sought 
to divide the field of medicine and surgery and make a separate pro­
fession of a part thereof. (Read St. v. Vondersluis, 42 Minn. 129 
or 43 N .W . 789.) It was thought that men who engage in treat­
ment of dental organs should receive special preparation on and be 
specially licensed to practice that branch of medicine and surgery. A  
Board of Dental Examiners was created and authorized to examine and 
determine who should practice dentistry in this state. A  department 
of Dental surgery was established at the State University, awarding 
a special degree. An examination of the course shows that it includes, 
besides a considerable part of the work required of medical students 
also those subjects which relate particularly to diseases of dental organs
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and others designed to insure efficiency in the mechanical phase of the 
treatment and restoration. The dental statute provides that: “ No 
person shall practice dentistry in the state without having complied 
with this law .”
The court further had to say that since the legislature had defined 
both the practice of medicine and the practice of dentistry and made 
the two distinct professions, and that the dental statute did not except 
physicians by expression or implication it would conclude that the 
intention was to require the physician to qualify as a dental practitioner 
if he desired to practice dentistry.
W e submit the two foregoing cases as a fair cross-section of the case 
law on this subject, and it is obvious from their holdings that as cases 
of this kind must be considered in the light of state statutes, the subject 
cannot be covered by any hard and fast rule. However, generally 
speaking, in the absence of contrary statute one holding a license to 
practice medicine will also have the right to practice dentistry. And, 
where dental state laws except physicians from their operation, the 
physician of course can legally practice dentistry. In the states 
however, where the practice of dentistry has been made a separate 
profession from medicine and physicians and surgeons have not been 
excepted, the court decisions construing the law are not in accord. It 
must be stated with emphasis, however, that a physician practicing 
dentistry under any condition must comply with the requirements as 
to skill, care and judgment.
And now may we invite you to consider with us, the value and 
importance of the records of the dentist and his expert testimony, in 
criminal investigation, in identifying persons dead or alive. I am 
of the opinion that in recent years, dental educators, and consequently 
dental students and practitioners have failed to place proper emphasis 
on this phase of professional training and practice. I am sure this 
matter is readily emphasized to us when we consider the recent attitude 
of the Federal Department of Justice in taking steps to cooperate with 
organized dentistry in standardizing dental records as a means of 
aiding materially in criminal investigation.
The authorities are in accord: That the teeth are among the last 
parts of the body to decompose, and, therefore since no two mouths 
are exactly alike the teeth and jaws furnish good and sometimes indis­
putable means of identifying a skeleton or corpse.
Criminal reports abound of instances in which the oral organs were 
important factors in determining the identity of a person or a body. 
Cases of doubtful identity have frequently been settled by casts of
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the mouth taken before death by the dentist. In this connection many 
questions, intricate and speculative may arise relative to conditions 
observed, and if called upon to make investigation, it should be made 
with a view to obtaining satisfactory data for an opinion on any subject 
which mav be reasonably anticipated. Whether missing teeth in a 
corpse or skeleton were lost before or after death; if before, how 
lon g ; the cause of a certain condition observed or whether such a con­
dition could have been produced by such and such means, or is the 
result of disease, or existed prior to death, or was caused by death; 
these and numberless other questions should claim the attention of the 
dentist as an investigator.
Dr. Rehfuss, an early writer on the subject, and whom we have con­
sulted closely in this study, cites a number of cases of mistaken, doubt­
ful, and disputed identity that were settled by means of expert dental 
testimony. However, we shall take time to bring to your attention 
only two cases illustrating the importance of the subject under con­
sideration. The first occurred in London, and is a most singular case 
of disputed identity, in which there was between two persons such 
a similarity of name, time, place, age, occupation, and circumstances 
as for a long time utterly to perplex investigation.
The body of a woman supposed to have been murdered was missing 
and another woman was arrested on suspicion of having committed 
the crime and sold the victim’s body for dissection. Both direct and 
circumstantial evidence brought the crime home to the suspect. I he 
day after the alleged murder, an old woman of the description of the 
supposed deceased was found with a fractured thigh lying exhausted 
on the street. Her name was Caroline Walsh and she said she was 
from Ireland. She died and was buried from the London Hospital. 
The missing woman was named Caroline Walsh, and she was also Irish. 
The prisoner, Elizabeth Ross, insisted that this was the missing woman 
whom she was accused of having murdered. Various points of difference 
were established by a number of witnesses, but the chief distinction 
was, that while the missing woman had very perfect incisor teeth (a 
remarkable and noticeable circumstance for her age, eighty-four), the 
other one who had died at the hospital had no front teeth and the 
sockets corresponding to them had been obliterated by time. The 
non-identity was further confirmed by relatives of the missing woman.
Perhaps one of the most interesting cases in the annals of criminal 
jurisprudence, is the Webster-Parkman trial which occurred in Massa­
chusetts. The following is a brief resume of the case: On November 
24, 1849, Dr. George Parkman, a wealthy and well known resident 
disappeared. He was last seen at the Medical College of Harvard
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University, in the company of the Professor of Chemistry, Dr. John 
W . Webster, his friend and protege. A  week after his disappearance, 
portions of human remains were found in a vault in Dr. W ebster’s 
laboratory; other parts were found in a tea-chest, while in a furnace 
were also pieces of human bones. Among the ashes, about 175 grains 
of gold were discovered ; also a lower tooth, with a cavity in it once 
filled by a den tal operation, three blocks of mineral teeth with rivets, 
but without the gold plates and a great many fragments of bone 
belonging to the skull and lower jaw. The bones and teeth appeared 
to have been exposed to intense heat. By ordinary medical experts, 
identification of these mutilated remains with that degree of certainty 
required by criminal law was impractical. Dr. Nathan Keep a cele­
brated New England dentist, however, not only identified the burned 
and mutilated jaw  and teeth as those of Dr. Parkman in a manner 
which amounted to a demonstration, but also, from the melting and 
chemical effects produced, was enabled to say what had been the means 
employed in the partial destruction. The remains thus being identified, 
and other evidence pointing so conclusively to Professor Webster as 
the murderer, the jury reached a verdict of guilty on the eleventh day 
of the trial. Dr. Webster eventually confessed the crime and paid 
the extreme penalty. The confession verified the particulars given by 
the dental experts. The case is cited in the American System of Dentis­
try, in W harton ’s Jurisprudence and is reported at length in the cur­
rent issue of Oral Hygiene under the title “ A  Celebrated Denture.” 
Dr. Dunn’s appropriate opening paragraph to the article in Oral 
Hygiene is quoted as follow s: The artificial teeth of Dr. George 
Parkman spoke louder than a thousand tongues. They told a scalp- 
tingling tale of horror. Upon them hinged the solution of an amazing 
murder, the identity of the victim and the guilt of the perpetrator.” 
Interest in this case may be heightened by considering the prominent 
social and professional status of the men involved. Dr. Parkman, the 
victim, had been instrumental in erecting the Medical School building 
at Harvard; Dr. Oliver W endell Holmes, an important witness was 
Parkman Professor of Anatomy and Physiology, and was a friend of 
Dr. Parkman and a colleague of the murderer. Dr. W m . T . G. 
Alorton, a dentist, famous for his general anesthetic achievements a 
few years previous was another witness. Dr. John W . Webster, Pro­
fessor of Chemistry in the medical school was one of the chief figures 
in the case. The premier witness was D r. Nathan C. Keep, the dentist 
of Dr. Parkman. Dr. Keep later was a moving spirit in establishing 
the College of Dentistry at Harvard University.
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MALPRACTICE
And now as we come to the consideration of Malpractice and a few 
of the many complexing problems that may confront us in connection 
therewith, we feel that we have reached the most important phase of the 
presentation. The term “ Malpractice” is variously defined by the 
writers on the subject. Rehfuss defines it as “ bad or unskilled practice 
in a dental surgeon, whereby an unskillful operation is performed, the 
health of the patient injured or his life destroyed by the improper 
and careless administration of medicines.”  A  very concise definition 
of the term is given bv Brothers, as, “ Improper treatment of a patient 
by a dentist whereby the patient is injured.”  From Black’s Law D ic­
tionary (2nd Ed.) page 751, we quote a more comprehensive and inclu­
sive definition of the term Malpractice: “ Bad, wrong, or injudicious 
treatment of a patient professionally and in respect to the particular 
disease or injury, resulting in injury, unnecessary suffering or death to 
the patient, and proceeding from ignorance, carelessness, want of proper 
professional skill, disregard of established rules or principles, neglect, 
or a malicious or criminal intent.” Notwithstanding the various defini­
tions, the authorities are generally agreed that to constitute malpractice 
in legal contemplation, the two essentials, (a ) improper treatment and, 
(b ) injury there from must be shown. These essentials must coexist in 
the relation of cause and effect and not as a mere coincidence. Noyes 
states very clearly that, “ injury to the patient is an essential feature 
of legal malpractice.” He says, that no matter how unskilful, incom­
petent, or careless a dentist may be, he is not guilty of malpractice from 
a legal point of view unless the patient suffers injury.” He further 
observes however, that, “ unskillful, incompetent, or negligent operating 
usually does injure the patient.”  The point is that in suits for mal­
practice the injury must be affirmatively proven and also the neglect or 
failure of professional duty. In discussing malpractice repeated refer­
ence must be made to the time worn terms, skill, care, and judgment 
as malpractice suits are usually based upon a default in one or more 
of these elements. As a rule either ignorance, carelessness, or bad 
judgment is alleged and sought to be shown. M any cases cited as said 
before will involve the general practice of medicine and surgery but 
bv anaologv the illustrations of the law are applicable to dental practice.
THE BASIS FOR LIABILITY
The basis for liability for malpractice rests on the duty owed the 
patient by the practitioner. So if the relation of dentist and patient 
has not been established, no liability can be incurred. Therefore a 
dentist is not liable for malpractice in refusing to treat a patient, not-
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withstanding the urgency of the case and the unavailability of another 
dentist. This point of law is clearly and definitely stated in court 
opinions in a number of cases, but the case of Hurly v. Eddingfield, 156 
Ind. 416 (1900) while an extreme one should illustrate sufficiently 
this point. The abbreviated facts are as follow s: A  patient, who was 
very ill sent for Dr. Eddingfield who had been the family physician, 
and the messenger explained the urgency involved and that no other 
aid was available and tendered the fee. The doctor was not busy 
but refused to go. The patient died supposedly for want of attention 
that the doctor might have given, and the legal representative sued 
“ for £10,000 damages in wrongfully causing the death of the deceased.”  
The trial court dismissed the suit and on appeal, the supreme court 
o f the state affirmed the lower court. The opinion in short was, that 
a physician is under no obligation to accept and treat a patient, that 
the license of the state to practice medicine is permissive and not com­
pulsory. Time will not permit the citing of the many other refer­
ences on this same point. Wharton, on “ Negligence,”  Paragraph 731, 
says, however, as to the common law requirement in this connection, 
that “ no question can exist as to legal right of a physician (and by 
same token a dentist) unless he be an officer of the government charged 
with specific duties which he thereby violates, to decline to take charge 
of a particular case.
So it seems to be a well established legal certainty that a physician 
or a dentist may refuse treatment to a patient for any cause or for no 
cause except his own personal whim. If, however, a patient is accepted 
and treatment is begun or promised, it must be continued unless the 
doctor is dismissed by the patient, or unless he gives notice to the patient 
that he will discontinue services and gives sufficient time to procure 
other services.
LACK OF SKILL OR CARE GIVING RISE TO 
LIABILITY
'I'he courts are not entirely agreed as to the degree of skill and 
care a dentist and a physician must use to escape liability for injury 
to a patient. A ll do hold, however, that the professional man is not 
required to possess and to use the highest degree of these elements pos­
sible. It is generally agreed also that a patient does not have to prove 
grosss negligence on the part of the practitioner in order to recover for 
malpractice. The negligence which renders a dentist liable in a mal­
practice suit is simply a failure to perform the duty which he as a 
professional man owes his patient. That duty may be expressed thuslv: 
That degree of skill, care and learning ordinarily possessed and exer-
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cised by members of his profession in good standing practicing in similar 
localities.
The case of Simonds v. Henry illustrates very clearly the law in 
this connection.
Simonds v. Henry, 39 Maine 155 (1855) illustrates the degree of 
skill, care and judgment required of the dentist in the manufacture 
and fitting of artificial teeth. Dentures were made for wife of defend­
ant. W hen put in the mouth she complained that they felt odd and 
pained her. The plates were filed but still she complained and declined 
to pay for them. It was agreed that she take them away and try 
them and return on a set day following. W hen she returned, she 
said she knew she could never wear them, etc., and left the dentures 
without paving for them. 'File dentist sued for the fee agreed upon. 
'Fhe evidence was conflicting as to the quality of service and fit of the 
dentures. One witness testified that they were a good piece of work, 
another that they were fairly average, and a third that they were 
nothing extra. Among other things the jury was instructed that if 
the dentist had used nil the knowledge and skill to which the art had 
advanced at that time, that would be all that could be required of 
h im ; that they should determine from the evidence whether the 
dentures were properly made and fitted. Upon this instruction the 
jury returned a verdict for the defendant. Exceptions were noted 
and appeal taken. Upon review it was definitely and clearly stated 
that the instructions were incorrect in point of law. Otherwise, every 
professional man would be required to possess the highest attainments 
and to exercise the greatest skill in his profession. Such a require­
ment would be unreasonable. Exceptions were sustained and new 
trial granted.
82 VERMONT 79, 1906
Illustrative of the law regarding skill and care required of specialists:
W here one holds himself out to he a specialist in Medical and surgical 
treatment of a particular organ, injury or disease and is employed as 
such he is bound to have and exercise such skill and knowledge in 
diagnosis and treatment as is ordinarily possessed by those who in the 
same general locality, devote special study and attention to the saine 
specialty.
The case involved treatment of an eve injured in an explosion in a 
railroad accident. Patient was treated by a general practitioner for 
a week and on being convinced that there was a foreign object in the 
eve sent him to specialist who casually examined it, treated it for a 
few days and sent the patient home assuring him that he would be
10
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O .K . But, he grew worse and returned to first doctor who removed 
a piece of tin an inch long and J/2  inch wide. Held that as a matter 
of law the specialist did not exercise the care required of him in diag­
nosing and treating this case. A  like ruling would surely obtain in 
connection with the services rendered by a dentist holding himself out 
as a specialist in a particular field.
Another case illustrating the degree of care and skill required of the 
professional man is reported in 40 111. 209.
Degree of Skill and Care Required in Rendering 
Professional Service, 40 111. 209
The following points of law of interest to us in this connection were 
decided :
1. The highest degree of care and skill is not required of a
physician (and would add by analogy of the dentist) to 
relieve him of liability from damages resulting from his 
treatment of a patient, only reasonable care and skill are 
necessary.
2. If a person holds himself out to the public as a professional
man, he must be held to ordinary care and skill in every 
case of which he assumes charge whether he receives fees 
or not.
3. W here he is merely asked his opinion as a friend or neigh­
bor and not in his professional capacity then no profes­
sional responsibility is incurred.
The case involves an appeal for a physician where in the lower 
court the jury w^ as instructed that the physician was liable for what­
ever damage might have accrued to the patient by reason of any want 
of care and skill on the part of physician. The court of appeals held 
that such charge to the jury stated the responsibility of the physician 
too strongly and too broadly as it requires the highest degree of care 
and skill and w’here as only reasonable care and skill are necessary.
As regards the skill and care required of a non-professional volunteer 
the following case is in point:
M attliei v. W orley, 69 111., App., 654— 1897. This point of law 
was declared: If by treating, operating on, or prescribing for physical 
ailments a persons holds himself out as a doctor to persons employing 
him and they believe him to be a doctor he will be chargeable as such.
The suit was against a druggist by a party who wTent to him with 
a hurt finger which the druggist treated wrongfully for ten dates. 
The result of it was his inability for a long time to work and finally 
amputation of the finger. The lower court found for the plaintiff
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and held that under the circumstances the defendant was chargeable 
with the necessity of using the skill and care of a physician. The court 
of appeals affirmed the judgment of the lower court. If the circum­
stances had been different, i.e., the druggist had not held himself out 
as a ph vsician hut had merely acted in the capacity of a non-professional 
volunteer he would not have been liable either criminally or civilly. In 
rendering this decision the court refers to the same line of reasoning 
in the case of M cN evins V. Lmv reported in 40 111., 209, which was 
heard in 1866 and in Richie v. II est, another Illinois case decided in 
1860.
A  very interesting and significant statement was made by the court 
in the case of Ritchie v. W est, the Illinois case referred to as having 
been tried in 1860 and is reported in 23rd 111. 329. T his statement 
in substance follow s: “ A  professional man undertaking to treat a patient 
is held to possession and use of skill which is ordinarily used by mem­
bers of his profession. And whether injury results from want of skill 
or want of its application, in either case he is equally liable. This, the 
law implies whenever a retainer or fee is shown, but when the services 
are rendered as a gratuity, gross negligence will alone create liability. 
The point should be stressed, however, that if the physician or dentist 
is employed in his professional capacity then he is chargeable with rea­
sonable skill, etc. whether he receives a fee or not, but if the services 
are in the nature of non-professional volunteer, gratuitous services, then 
he is only liable for his gross negligence.
Very often a patient presents and requests service the wisdom of 
which is seriously doubted by the dentist. However, the patient per­
sistently insists and the dentist is often in a quandary as to what his 
course of procedure should be.
The case of Gramm v. Boener, 56 Ind. 497, 1877, appropriately 
illustrates a case of this kind. The case involved suit against a surgeon, 
who, at the request and insistence of the patient, had rebroken and 
reset an arm and a leg whereby the patient lost the use of the arm 
and his leg became crooked, deformed, and permanently lame. The 
lower court gave jury instructions which led to verdict and judgment 
for the plaintiff for 53,000.00. On appeal the judgment was reversed 
and a new trial ordered on grounds o f improper instruction to the 
jury. In reversing the lower court, the court of appeals among many 
other things, had this in substance to say: “ It seems to us to be the 
duty of a surgeon when called upon to perform an operation to advise 
against it if in his opinion it is unnecessary, unreasonable, or will result 
in injury to the patient. T he patient is entitled to the professional 
man's judgment whether he asks it or not. I f the surgeon proceeds
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to the operation without expressing an opinion as to its necessity or 
propriety, the patient should presume that in the opinion of the surgeon 
the operation was correct. However, if the surgeon when called upon, 
advises the patient who is of mature years and sound mind that the 
operation is improper and unnecessary and the patient still insists, the 
surgeon finally complies, we do not see upon what principle the surgeon 
can be held responsible to the patient for damages on grounds that 
the operation was improper and injurious. In such cases, the patient 
relies on his own judgment and not upon that of the surgeon and he 
can not complain.
“ It might be observed, however, that if lack of reasonable care 
and skill in performing the said operation is shown then liability nat­
urally would obtain.”
As dental practitioners we are very often faced with possibilities 
analogous to these mentioned in this case. W hen we are requested to 
remove a tooth and we feel that it is unwise to do so, or to place an 
appliance that might be injurious to the patient, or to render any service, 
the wisdom of which we seriously doubt, we should at least discuss 
very fully the improprieties involved and proceed very cautiously if 
at all.
Malpractice Involving Negligence of Patient 
Sanderson vs. Hollan, 39 Mo. Appeal 233— 1889
This was a suit for damages for injury in poorly treating a child’s 
broken arm. Erysipelas developed and the limb was lost. The defense 
insisted that the legligence of the parents of the child subsequent to the 
treatment should bar the right to recover. Evidence was convincing 
that the treatment in the first instance was improper and the court 
held that as a matter of law the negligence of the patient following 
the treatment should not bar recovery but at best should be considered 
in mitigation of the damages. It was very clearly set forth that such 
negligence as will constitute a defense must have concurred in producing 
the injury. Another case was reported in 49 Washington 557— 1908 
involving negligence of patient. The suit was based on injury to 
patient’s foot through alleged improper use of X-Ray. In discussing 
the merits of the case the appellate court made these material observa­
tions :
( 1 ) Upon conflicting evidence in an action for malpractice in treating 
a foot by X -Ray, the question of negligence is one for the jury, where 
there was evidence warranting a finding that the foot was severely 
burned and the treatment improper and the injury was caused by 
placing tubes too near and without any shield.
5
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(2 ) Ignorance as to the effect of X -R ay exposure would he no 
defense in causing X -Ray burn but rather might make the use of same 
negligence in itself.
(3 ) In an action for malpractice such as this is it an error to
instruct the jury that the patient could not recover if she quit the 
treatment before she should have or if she failed to follow the
physician’s instructions since such acts although adding to the damages 
did not cooperate in causing the injury nor would they bar the
recovery for injury done.
The court in this case quotes from an Oregon case a very clear state­
ment concerning the effect of patients’ negligence in a suit for mal­
practice. The quotation follow s:
“ The contributory negligence which prevents recovery is that which 
cooperates in causing the injury— some act or omission concurring 
with the act or omission of the other party to produce the injury and
without which the injury would not have happened; and negligence
which has no operation in causing injury but merely adds to the damages 
resulting is no bar to the action, although it will detract from the 
damages as a whole.”
Surely by analogy, a dental practitioner negligently making an ex­
traction and injuring a patient could not escape liability by show'ing 
that the patient did not return for treatment as he directed. Though 
such failure to cooperate should lessen the damages to be aw'arded. 
Negligence of the patient following a negligent act of the practitioner 
does not discharge the liability, but is simply taken in mitigation of 
damages.
The same is held in Du Buis v. Decker, 130 N .Y . 325. McCracken  
v. Smut hers, 122 N .C. 799, the North Carolina case, involved partic­
ularly the patient’s failure to return for follow-up treatment. Among 
the instructions as to law which were given the jury in the case the 
following are of interest to us.
(1 ) The care and skill required of a dentist, while not necessarily 
the highest known to the profession can not be limited to such as 
is exercised by dentist in his own neighborhood, but must be such 
as is possessed and practiced by the average of his profession in the 
same general neighborhood or in such given localities or in similar 
localities. Fo say one’s own neighborhood or town would render the 
.standard of the profession too variable, possibly too low, as the place 
might contain only one or two dentists whose qualifications might be 
rather inferior and to prove the ability of each by the standing of the 
other would be equally unjust to the profession and to the patients. 
Instruction No. 2
W here the liability of a dentist for malpractice is established
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the fact that the patient after such malpractice disobeyed the instruc­
tion of the dentist and so aggravated the injury does not discharge 
the latter’s liability.
As to patient’s duty to seek other assistance the case of Chamberlain V. 
M organ  is in point. It is reported 68 Pa. 168, and was tried in 1871. 
The material facts were these:
The patient, Hattie Morgan sued Dr. Chamberlain for malpractice 
by which her arm that had been dislocated had become stiffened. There 
was much testimony by the plaintiff as to manner of treatment by 
defendant. After some time she went to Drs. Halsey and Richardson 
who diagnosed the dislocation and offered to reduce it. Plaintiff’s 
father said that as long as she was improving so fast he should not 
have disturbed it. 'Pile defendant insisted that by plaintiff’s refusal 
to accept suggestion of Dr. Richardson, he should be relieved or that 
this negligence should mitigate the damages. The court’s observa­
tions were in part as follow s:
(1 ) It is incumbent upon an injured party to do whatever he rea­
sonably can to lessen the injury.
(2 ) In an action against a physician for malpractice to an injured 
arm he offered to prove by a consulting physician that he proposed to 
put the patient under an anesthetic and reduce the arm. Held that 
the offer was properly rejected. Judgment for $300.00, for plaintiff 
affirmed.
W ith reference to responsibility for independent acts of professional 
men, as anesthetist and dentist the following points were made clear 
in the case of Nelson v. Sandell, 1926, Iowa Supreme Court, 209 N .W . 
4+0, or 46 American Law Rep. 1447.
1. The mere recommendation of one doctor by another does not 
render him liable for the other’s negligence.
2. A  physician is bound to bring to his patient and apply to his 
case that degree of knowledge, skill, attention and care that is ordinarily 
possessed and exercised by practitioners under like circumstances and 
in like localities.
3. Whether or not a physician or dentist exercises the care and 
skill required of him can not be determined from testimony of laymen 
or non experts since it is only those learned in the professions who 
can say what should have been done.
4. A physician’s liability for malpractice is not determined by mere 
failure to effect a cure.
5. A joint employment of a physician and dentist for the extraction 
of a tooth which will render the physician liable for negligence of the
15
Davis: A Comparative Case Study of Selected Phases of Law for the Dentis
Published by Digital Howard @ Howard University, 1937
28 HOWARD UNIVERSITY BULLETIN
dentist is not shown by evidence that physician recommended the dentist 
to perform the operation and agreed to administer the anesthetic and 
look after the patient’s interest.
6. A  physician who merely administers an anesthetic to a patient 
who is operated on by another is generally not liable for the negligence 
of the practicing surgeon.
This case was much involved and concerned removal by dentist of 
impaction and the administration of the anesthetic by the doctor. The 
jaw  was fractured. The physician had been treating the patient for 
neuritis and painful conditions throughout the body which he attributed 
possibly to an impacted lower 3rd molar. He X-Rayed the region 
and recommended the patient to a certain dentist for extraction. A r­
rangements were made and the physician agreed to administer the 
anesthetic and to look out for the patient generally. The second molar 
was first removed and in removing the impacted tooth the mandible 
was fractured. Treatment for the fracture by the two involved 
several attempts at reduction and wiring and irrigations, in fact, the 
usual routine treatment was employed over a period of a couple 
of weeks.
The instant suit was brought jointly against the physician and dentist 
charging negligence in operating and in removing the tooth. The out­
come of the suit was to discharge the physician of liability for the 
dentist’s negligence in the operation, and the case against the dentist 
was dismissed as being improperly brought as to place.
Malpractice— Professional Man’s Responsibility for 
Negligence of Nurses, Baker vs. Wentworth,
155 Mass. 338-189
This case involves an attempt to charge a surgeon with the negligence 
of nurses at a hospital where the patient was attended after the opera­
tion. The physician was not the proprietor of the hospital and although 
it was on his advice that this hospital was chosen still it was held 
that he was not responsible for negligence of nurses in caring for the 
patient after the operation and thus in spite of the claim that the patient 
thought it to be the physician’s private hospital, since neither he or 
any one acting for him had made any such representation to that 
effect.
Ewing v. Goode, 78 Federal Report 442 is a case illustrating the 
following points with respect to malpractice.
1. In order to recover damages from physicians or surgeons for want 
of proper care and skill the plaintiff must show both that the defendant 
was unskillful or negligent and that injury was produced by want of 
his skill or care.
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2. M  ere lack of skill or negligence without injury gives no right 
to recover even nominal damages.
3. As to warranty. A  physician is not a warrantor of cures in the 
absence of an express contract to that effect. His implied obligation 
arising from employment is one that no injury shall result from any 
want of care or skill on his part.
The case instant involved treatment of eyes of patient over a long 
period. One eye was operated on several times and was finally lost. 
Patient sued for malpractice based on lack of skill because he did 
not effect a cure. N o negligence or lack of skill and care was shown. 
The judge in directing the verdict for defendant stated clearly the above 
points of law.
Burk v. Foster, 114 Ky., page 20, 1902.
Malpractice suit, which was the outgrowth of wrong diagnosis or 
failure to properly diagnose a dislocated shoulder. The facts were sub­
stantially these: On Jan. 31, 1900, plaintiff sustained injury to arm 
and shoulder by a runaway team, hitched to farm wagon. The arm 
was fractured and shoulder dislocated. Defendant was called, who 
diagnosed and successfully treated the fracture. He did not, accord­
ing to his own admission discover the dislocation and said that it was 
not then dislocated, but admits he found it dislocated on an examination 
made after the patient had been discharged. The patient did not know 
his shoulder was dislocated until more than two months after the 
injury when a Dr. Stamper upon casual examination one day in a 
store told him so. He reported this to D r. Foster who was his first 
doctor but was told that it was sore and would slowly heal. The 
suit was brought in August 1900 to recover damages for neglect in 
failing to discover and correct the dislocated shoulder whereby the 
plaintiff was permanently injured. In the lower court under error in 
instruction of the court the jury found for the defendant on appeal the 
case was remanded for new trial with direction for proper instruc­
tions. In giving an opinion on this case the court made several very 
important observations as to the construction of law in that state 
in such cases, two of which were in substance as follow s:
1. The care and skill required of a physician in treating is not 
to be measured by that exercised by ordinarily skilled and prudent phy­
sicians in that particular locality in treating a like injury, but by such 
as is exercised generally by physicians of ordinary care and skill in 
similar communities.
2. The mere fact that the result of a patient’s treatment is as good 
as is usually obtained in like cases similarly situated will not preclude 
a recovery by the patient against the physician for negligence or lack
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of skill, the patient being entitled to the chance for the better results 
which might come from proper treatment.
The case of Toms v. Aiken reported in 126 Iowa 114, also involved 
mistake in diagnosis and treatment of dislocation of the clavicle, and 
the verdict was for the plaintiff. From judgment thereon defendants 
appealed and obtained a reversal.
The importance of correct diagnosis by the dentist and the recent 
trend of the attitude towards the legal requirements in this connection 
are both demonstrated in the two cases reported by Leslie Childs in 
the 1935 October Cosmos. One case occurred in Nebraska— 126 Neb. 
629. 253 N .W ., 871, and the other came to trial in California in 121 
Cal. Opp. 264. Both cases involved extraction of teeth for patients 
who presented with considerable pathological involvement. There was 
pain, swelling, rapid pulse, and fever. Injections and extractions were 
made without proper examination and diagnosis. In both cases ostemy- 
litis and cellulitis followed. The suit in the first case resulted in 
judgment for the plaintiff of $10,000 which was upheld by the higher 
court. The result in the second case was also in favor of the plaintiff. 
It was already set forth in these cases that malpractice may consist of 
a lack of skill and care in diagnosis as well as in treatment. I he 
detailed facts in these cases are interesting and may be read in either 
the issue of the Cosmos mentioned or in the Court reports referred to.
The Liability of the Dentist for Infection Following-
Extraction
A  large number of the malpractice cases that the dentist is called 
upon to defend are the outgrowth of infection and the many com­
plications following extraction. These cases are surprisingly similar 
as to their facts: Usually the patient presents with badly broken down 
teeth, possibly hidden roots, and has been suffering intense pain over 
a period of several days. The teeth are removed and complications 
follow. The patient is ready to trace back the post-extraction pains, 
swelling, etc., and charge it to the improper and negligent treatment 
by the dentist. In cases of this kind the question of what the patient 
must prove to recover from the dentist, becomes interesting to all of 
us. Generally speaking, he must allege and prove negligence was 
the proximate cause of the injury complained of.
The application of the rule of law is appropriately demonstrated 
in a Wisconsin case reported in 173 W is. 484, 180 N .W . 821, the 
abbreviated facts of which follow : The patient presented on Saturday 
and a badly broken down tooth was removed in two parts. A  pus 
sac was attached to one root but none to the other. The socket was
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not curetted, but was washed out with boric acid and swabbed with 
iodine. The patient returned on Monday with much swelling, socket 
was washed out and painted with iodine. The patient returned as 
directed for several treatments. The conditions, however, grew worse 
and on Wednesday the case was referred to an oral surgeon, who 
discovered serious infection, curetted the socket, incised deeply, drained, 
and finally removed seven teeth and a portion of the jaw-bone.
It was claimed in the suit, of course, that the infection was caused 
by the improper treatment by the dentist. The patient among other 
things testified that the dentist injected the needle into his lip and 
without resterilization injected into the gum. This was denied by 
the dentist. The judgment in the first instance was in favor of the 
plaintiff for $10,000. A  reduction by the court to $4,745.00 was 
accepted by the patient and an appeal was taken by the dentist to the 
Supreme Court of Wisconsin. In reviewing the case it was said 
in substance: The evidence sustained a finding of a lack of reasonable 
skill and care on the part of the dentist; it was conceded that there 
was infection in the lower jaw. The question is what caused the 
infection. In order to recover, plaintiff must produce evidence to 
justify a finding that it was due to the defendant’s negligence. The 
burden is not met by showing that infection might have been the result 
of two or more causes, one of which was defendant’s unskillful treat­
ment. Judgment was reversed and lower court instructed to dismiss 
the case.
A  Maryland case along the same line and in which the facts are 
somewhat similar is reported in 137 M d. 227, 112 Atl. 179. The 
greatly abbreviated facts in this case follow : The plaintiff had a tooth 
extracted and the dentist failed to remove all the roots. There was 
post-extraction trouble and after a month or more the patient presents 
to another dentist, the defendant in this case, and had the roots removed. 
Following this operation there was considerable hemorrhage, pain, and 
swelling. The patient had been told to return for treatment if trouble 
was experienced, but instead, on the day following, the family physician 
was called in. He discovered necrosis of the bone, and after several 
days treatment, the patient was hospitalized. In the course of treat­
ment, there was thorough scraping away of all necrotic substance. 
Finally, two more teeth were extracted and all involved surrounding 
bone was removed. W ithout further trouble the patient recovered. 
Suit followed against the dentist No. 2 who had removed the roots, 
on the theory that his negligence and unskillfulness caused the injuries 
suffered. "File result in the lower court was judgment for the plaintiff. 
After a careful review of the evidence and the record, the Court of
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Appeals reversed the judgment without even a new trial. It held 
that plaintiff had failed to prove negligence or unskillfulness on the 
part of the dentist.
By way of summary in these two cases it may be submitted that 
the dentist is duty bound to use ordinary care and skill in his work, 
and in the absence of proof to the contrary he is presumed to have 
done so. It follows then that in case infection follows dental services 
rendered the burden is on the patient to show the negligence of dentist 
and its relation to the injury as the proximate cause.
M ay we submit further, that while the law in these cases may 
appear too simple and obvious to waste time on, yet the proper con­
struction of law is not all certain to us, since so many cases must be 
carried to the Superior Courts for consistent adjudication.
Miscellaneous Considerations
It is hoped that under this subhead it may be interesting and en­
lightening to review the Oregon State Case which involved the validity 
of the state law which prohibited advertising in dental practice. The 
title of the case is Semler v. Oregon State Board of Dental Examiners 
and is an appeal from the Supreme Court of Oregon. It was argued 
Match 7, 1935, and was decided April 1, 1935. It is reported in the 
294 United States Supreme Court Report, page 608.
In this case the following points were decided:
1. The fact that an exercise of the police power forbidding certain 
forms of advertising by dentists will interfere with existing contracts 
for display signs and press notices does not touch the validity of the 
regulations.
2. A  regulation of dentist is not invalid as to them because it does 
not extend to the other professional classes.
3. A  regulation preventing dentists from advertising their profes­
sional superiority and their prices; from use of certain forms of adver­
tising signs; from use of advertising solicitors or publicity agents; from 
advertising free dental work, free examinations, guaranteed work and 
painless operations, held valid under due process clause of 14th Amend­
ment, without regard to the truthfulness of the representations or the 
benefit of the services advertised.
4. It is within the authority of the state to estimate the baleful 
effects of such advertising and to protect the community not only against 
deception but against practices which, though they may be free from 
deception in particular instances, tend nevertheless to lower the 
standards of and to demoralize the profession.
Chief Justice Hughes delivered the opinion of the court in this
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case and it is hoped that many of you will find time to read it care­
fully at an early date, because in so doing I feel that the reaction will 
be a wholesome one on the attitude of the reader towards dentistry as 
a profession.
Previous legislation had provided for the revocation of dental licenses 
for unprofessional conduct, which as then defined included advertising 
of an untruthful and misleading nature. The Act of 1933 amended the 
definition so as to provide as quoted above, additional grounds for 
revocation.
Oregon Case
The plaintiff D r. Semler sought to enjoin the State Board from 
enforcing the law on the grounds of unconstitutionality. The Circuit 
Court ruled against the Doctor, the State Supreme Court sustained 
the Circuit Court and finally the case came on appeal to the U.S. 
Supreme Court where it was affirmed.
Excerpts from the opinion follow : (1 ) Plaintiff is not entitled to 
complain of interference with contracts he describes if the regulation 
is not an unreasonable exercise of the protective power of the State; 
(2 ) The State was not bound to deal alike with all classes or to strike 
at all evils at the same time in the same w ay; (3 ) W e do not doubt 
the authority of the State to estimate the baleful effects of such methods 
and to put a stop to them. The legislature was not dealing with 
traders in commodities, but with the vital interest of public health, and 
with a profession treating bodily ills and demanding different standards 
of conduct from those which are traditional in the competition in the 
market places. The community is concerned with the maintenance of 
professional standards which will insure not only competence in indi­
vidual practitioners but protection against those who would prey 
upon a public peculiarly susceptible to imposition through alluring 
promises of relief from pain. And the community is concerned in 
providing safeguards not only against deception, but against practices 
which would tend to demoralize the profession by forcing its members 
into an unseemly rivalry which would enlarge the opportunities of 
the least scrupulous.
It should be heartening in the extreme to know that the highest 
court in the land assumes this attitude toward the services we render 
our various communities.
Cases: Watson  V. Maryland, 218 U.S. 173, 179
D r. Bloom, Dentist, Inc. v. Cruise, 228 U.S., 588
Graves V. M inn., 272 U.S., 425; Dent. V. W .V a., 129 U.S. 114
iMills v. State Board, 90 Colo. 193
Booth v. Illinois, 184 U.S. 425
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Owner of X-Ray Plates
A  very vexing problem very often occurs with reference to the 
ownership of X -R ay films. From an editorial in the Central Law 
Journal Volume 95, page 133, we take this comment on the subject: 
There is an interesting discussion of this subject in the Journal of the 
American Medical Association for October 1, 1921, page 1121. It 
is there said that this question has never been passed on by a court of 
last resort. The writer goes on to say: “ The patient goes to the 
physician, primarily for a diagnosis of his condition and for such 
treatment as may be indicated. The physician makes an examination 
of which the taking of roentgenograms is a part. If the pictures are 
made by the physician himself then they are a part of his records of 
the case. If taken by the roentgenologist then the report to the physician 
perhaps accompanied by the prints of the negative is a part of the 
clinical record. The diagnosis is based upon the examination and 
the clinical record. The patient pays for the opinion and the treat­
ment, not the means by which they were determined. He does not pay 
for the plates any more than he does for the apparatus. In the absence 
of any special agreement, the patient has no legal right to the X-Ray 
plates.
Close reflection upon the various cases submitted brings us to the 
sober realization, I believe, that while the abstract law covering our 
duties and rights as professional men may remain the same, the con­
struction, interpretation, and application of these basic principles 
have varied and are subject to vary according to time, place, the temper 
of the communities and the temperament of the juries and judges. It 
behooves us, therefore, to know of our legal duties and rights as 
thoroughly as possible; to be careful to reasonably discharge our duties 
at all times; and to be ready to defend our rights to the last “ ditch," 
either through individual or organized effort.
R eferences:—-
Dental Jurisprudence, W m . F. Rehfuss 
Dental Jurisprudence, Elmer D. Brothers 
Law for the Dentist, Leslie Childs 
Ethics and Jurisprudence for the Dentists, Noyes 
Case references cited.
All Together Men. Let’s Go. The National Dental Association 
Meeting is August 10, 11, 12, 13, at Washington, D. C.
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